Our Results
Our initial motivation was to complete the security proof outlined by Haber and Stornetta [1997] .
• We show that the security condition presented by Haber and Stornetta is unattainable because it overlooks precomputation • Inspired by a patent scenario, we derive a different security condition • We modify the time stamp verification procedure • We present a security proof for the modified scheme Server S -issues time stamps and publishes roundly digests. Repository R -a write-only database for publishing roundly digests. Verifier V -verifies time stamps.
Server Procedure
During the t-th round, S receives a list x 1 , . . . , x m of k-bit requests and computes the root r t = G h (x 1 , . . . , x m ) of a hash tree and sends r t to R.
Server Repository Client S issues time-certificates c = (x, t, n, z), where n is a -bit identifier , and z = (z 1 , z 2 , . . . , z ).
Example: The certificate for x 1 is (x 1 , t, 0000, (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 )).
Verifier Procedure
To verify a certificate (x, t, n, z), where n = n 1 n 2 . . . n , a verifier:
• Obtains an authentic copy of r t by querying R, • Computes (y 0 , y 1 , . . . , y ), where y 0 := x, and for i = 1, . . . , :
• Checks if y def = F h (x; n; z) ? = r t .
Example: The verification of(x 1 , t, 0000, (z 1 , z 2 , z 3 , z 4 )):
Security condition
Adversary (Haber, Stornetta): Adversary A HS sends requests x 1 , . . . , x m to S, obtains digests r 1 , . . . , r s form R, and tries to find (x, t, n, z) so that
x ∈ {x 1 , . . . , x m } and F h (x; n; z) = r t ∈ {r 1 , . . . , r s }. The Security Condition is not Attainable!
The scheme above is insecure against the following behavior of A HS :
• A HS picks x and z 0 uniformly at random.
• A HS sends x 0 = h(x, z 0 ) to S and obtains c = (x 0 , t, n, z).
• A HS computes a "fake" certificate (x, t, 0 n, z 0 z).
By definition, F h (x; 0 n; z 0 z) = F h (x 0 ; n; z) = r t . Hence, the attack is successful whenever x = x 0 (as far as {x 1 , . . . , x q } = {x 0 }).
If h has reasonable security properties then Pr[x = x 0 ] is non-negligible.
New Security Condition
• Bob, a criminal who steals inventions (in cooperation with S), computes r 1 , . . . , r s (not necessarily using G h ) that are stored in R.
• Alice, an inventor, creates a description X A of her invention and timestamps x A = H(X A ). Some time later, X A is disclosed to the public.
• Bob creates a slightly modified version X B of the description (inventor's name should be replaced!) and computes x = H(X B )
• Bob tries to find (n, z), so that F h (x; n; z) ∈ {r 1 , . . . , r s }.
New security condition: For every poly-time A = (A 1 , A 2 ) and for every poly-sampleable distribution D with Rényi entropy H 2 (D) = ω(log k):
Security
Let N ⊂ {0, 1} * (set of valid identifiers) and |N|= k O(1) . N can be viewed as a hashing scheme published by S before the service starts.
New verification procedure:
To verify c = (x, t, n, z) for X ∈ {0, 1} * , the verifier checks if x = H(X), F h (x; n; z) = r t , and n ∈ N.
New definition for the success probability of A: Proof of Theorem 1: Having A = (A 1 , A 2 ) with ratio T (k)/δ(k), we construct a collision-finder A for h with ratio
-A calls A 1 to obtain R, N, and a; -A picks X,X ← D and computes (n, z) ← A 2 (X, a), (n , z ) ← A 2 (X , a); -A simulates F h (H(X); n; z) and F h (H(X ); n ; z ). -If F h (H(X);n;z) = F h (H(X );n ;z ), H(X) = H(X ), and n = n then A checks the h-calls and outputs a collision for h.
We prove (Lemma 1) that if x = x and F h (x; n; z) = F h (x ; n; z ) then the h-calls of F h (x; n; z) and F h (x ; n; z ) comprise a collision.
It can be shown (Lemma 2) that the success of A is at least
.
Security Proofs and Oracle Separation
Semi black-box reduction:
Black-box reduction: ∃ pol S∀A: A breaks TS h ⇒ S A,h breaks h.
Separation:
If h is collision-resistant relative to O but TS h is insecure relative to O, then there exist no black-box reductions. Strong separation: If in addition, O = π h for a poly-time π, then there exist no semi black-box reductions. 
Necessity of the Modified Verification
We prove that semi black-box reductions are insufficient for proving the security of the unmodified time-stamping scheme, based on the collisionresistance of h (and H).
We construct an oracle O relative to which there exists a collision-resistant hash function h O : {0, 1} 2k → {0, 1} k and a poly-time We construct a hash function oracle H k : {0, 1} 2k → {0, 1} k , which is collision-resistant relative to itself but H 4k can be used to break the timestamping scheme that uses H k . (Rules out semi black-box reductions) Construction of O O comprises a random function H ← F and responds to:
• H-queries: on input (x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} 2k return H(x 1 , x 2 ) ∈ {0, 1} k .
• A 1 -queries: on input 1 k return the root r k of the complete Merkle tree M k , the leaves of which are all k-bit strings in lexicographic order.
• A 2 -queries: on input x ∈ {0, 1} k find z ∈ ({0, 1} k ) k (based on M k ) so that F H (x; x; z) = r k and output (x, z). The reduction obtained is poly-preserving:
Practical guarantees are limited: If the time-stamping scheme is broken with ratio
= 2 32 (very efficiently!) then the reduction implies that h with 160-bit output can be broken with ratio 2 81 , which is trivially true.
The reduction gives practical security guarantees only in case k > 400 -much larger than in the existing schemes.
Question: Are there more efficient reductions? For example, linear-preserving reductions:
T h a n k Y o u !
